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Abstract
Deep learning in audio signal processing, such as human voice audio signal clas-
sification, is a rich application area of machine learning. Legitimate use cases
include voice authentication, gunfire detection, and emotion recognition. While
there are clear advantages to automated human speech classification, applica-
tion developers can gain knowledge beyond the professed scope from unprotected
audio signal processing. In this paper we propose the first privacy-preserving
solution for deep learning-based audio classification that is provably secure. Our
approach, which is based on Secure Multiparty Computation, allows to classify
a speech signal of one party (Alice) with a deep neural network of another party
(Bob) without Bob ever seeing Alice’s speech signal in an unencrypted manner.
As threat models, we consider both passive security, i.e. with semi-honest par-
ties who follow the instructions of the cryptographic protocols, as well as active
security, i.e. with malicious parties who deviate from the protocols. We evaluate
the efficiency-security-accuracy trade-off of the proposed solution in a use case
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for privacy-preserving emotion detection from speech with a convolutional neu-
ral network. In the semi-honest case we can classify a speech signal in under 0.3
sec; in the malicious case it takes ∼1.6 sec. In both cases there is no leakage of
information, and we achieve classification accuracies that are the same as when
computations are done on unencrypted data.
Keywords: convolutional neural network, deep learning, emotion recognition,
privacy, secure multiparty computation
1. Introduction
Speech technology is becoming increasingly prevalent and intrusive [1]. Speech
data, i.e. recordings of human speech, are automatically classified for various
purposes, extending from user authentication, to control of services and devices,
surveillance, and marketing. The developing prevalence of speech audio process-
ing technology stems from the ever-increasing demand of devices and programs
that are “always-listening” – such as smartphones, televisions, and intelligent
digital voice assistants – and the technological improvements in speech technol-
ogy. Beyond applications that aim to automatically classify speakers or speech,
e.g. for authentication or for emotion detection, respectively, there are countless
interesting sound classification tasks2 that may include speech audio processing.
These include gunfire detection in surveillance, cough sensing in healthcare, and
noise mitigation enabled by smart acoustic sensor networks [2, 3].
While there are apparent benefits to automated speech audio signal recog-
nition,3 application developers can gain knowledge beyond the professed scope
from unprotected audio signals. A wealth of personal data can be extracted
from speech audio signals, including age and gender, health and emotional
state, racial or ethnic origin, geographical background, social identity, and socio-
2See e.g. the IEEE AASP Challenge on Detection and Classification of Acoustic Scenes
and Events, http://dcase.community/challenge2020/
3See the Interspeech Computational Paralinguistics Challenges for an overview of applica-
tions: http://www.compare.openaudio.eu/
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economic status [4]. As stated in the recent survey paper by Nautsch et al., the
continued success of speech technologies hinges upon the development of reli-
able and efficient privacy-preservation capabilities, specifically designed for the
automatic processing of speech signals [1]. Efforts to safeguard the privacy of
users in data driven applications are underway along at least three dimensions:
(1) by laws and regulations such as the EU General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA); (2) by anonymiza-
tion techniques that aim to suppress personally identifiable information in data4;
and (3) by protecting sensitive data through encryption.
In this paper, we focus on the latter, using techniques from Secure Multi-
party Computation (MPC). MPC is an umbrella term for cryptographic ap-
proaches that allow two or more parties to jointly compute a specified output
from their private information in a distributed fashion, without actually reveal-
ing the private information to each other [5]. As illustrated in Figure 1, speech
classification is inherently a two-party computation (2PC) problem, where one
party – nicknamed Alice henceforth – has a speech signal or sound fragment
that needs to be classified, and another party – nicknamed Bob – has a machine
learning (ML) classifier that can be used to this end. Similar to how Alice does
not want to disclose her speech data to Bob, Bob may not want to disclose his
ML model to Alice for a variety of reasons. ML models can be expensive to
train and usually constitute a competitive advantage. For example, as reported
by Dalskov et al. [6], the network by Yang et al. [7] costs between $61,000 and
$250,000 to train [8]. Furthermore, deep learning models are powerful enough to
memorize specific examples from the training data [9], hence disclosing a trained
model can leak very specific information about the training data, which might
be sensitive in itself. Finally, disclosing the trained ML model increases the like-
lihood that adversaries can develop successful evasion attacks. In the context of
speaker or speech characterization, such attacks could consist of altering speech
4A nice example is the VoicePrivacy Challenge:
https://www.voiceprivacychallenge.org/
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signals to bypass speaker verification systems or to bypass classifiers that detect
“fake speech”, i.e. that detect the use of speech synthesis tools for malicious
purposes such as spreading misinformation, harassment and intimidation [10].
MPC allows oblivious speech classification through computations over en-
crypted data. In this way, Alice can classify her speech signal using Bob’s model,
without Alice revealing her speech signal to anyone in plaintext, and without
Bob disclosing his ML model to anyone in-the-clear, i.e. without encryption.
To this end, Alice and Bob engage in computations, and they exchange inter-
mediate encrypted results by communicating with each other. At the end of
the oblivious speech classification protocol, Alice and Bob each have “shares”
of the inferred class label (e.g. the emotion state of Alice). The true class label
is revealed only when these shares are combined, e.g. when, depending on the
application, (1) Bob sends his shares to Alice, or (2) Alice sends his shares to
Bob, or (3) both Alice and Bob send their shares to a third party, like a health
care provider who might need to be informed when Alice is not doing well.
MPC has already been used for speaker and speech recognition with hidden
Markov models (HMMs) and Gaussian mixture models (GMMs) [11, 12, 13, 14].
While HMMs and GMMs were popular techniques for speech classification in
the 1980s and 1990s, more recently deep learning has emerged as a state-of-the-
art technique in this field. To the best of our knowledge, MPC-based secure
classification of speech with deep neural networks has never been studied. It is
this gap in the literature, which is also called out by Nautsch et al. [1], that we
fill in this paper.
Several kinds of neural network architectures can be used for speech classifi-
cation. As cryptographic methods are known to result in significant increases to
computational complexity and/or communication overheads [4], we choose con-
volutional neural networks (CNNs), which are computationally less intensive
than for instance long short-term memory networks (LSTMs), even without
encryption. To the best of our knowledge, all existing work on MPC-based
classification with CNNs is developed for and focused on 2-dimensional CNNs,
which are commonly used for classification of images. Speech on the other hand
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Figure 1: Oblivious speech classification as a two-party computation (2PC) problem in the
dishonest majority setting (Section 3.2.2)
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can, like text, be most naturally thought of as a 1-dimensional input. In addi-
tion to being the first work on provably secure speech classification using CNNs,
this paper is also the first on MPC-based privacy-preserving classification with
1-dimensional CNNs.
After describing the relationships between this paper and existing work in
Section 2, in Section 3 we present details about the proposed methods. These
include the pre-processing of the audio and the proposed MPC-friendly neural
network architecture, a description of the security settings, and MPC-based
protocols for secure classification with 1-dimensional CNNs. We implemented
our approach on top of the MP-SPDZ framework [15]. In Section 4, we present
accuracy and runtime results on the RAVDESS benchmark data set [16] for
emotion detection from speech. In the active security setting, i.e. with malicious
adversaries that may deviate from the protocol, a speech signal is classified in
∼1.6 sec. In the passive security setting, i.e. with semi-honest adversaries that
adhere to the protocol instructions but try to learn additional information, we
can classify a speech signal in 0.26 sec. The accuracy in both cases is 96.6%,
which is the same as the accuracy of performing speech classification in-the-
clear. In other words, there is no accuracy loss. Furthermore, our approach
is provably secure: nobody other than Alice learns anything about her speech
signal, and nobody other than Bob learns anything about his model parameters.
As we highlight in Section 5, these results answer a question that has remained
open in the literature thus far, namely to what extent MPC-based protocols can
enable provably secure and highly accurate real-time speech recognition.
2. Related work
We refer to the work of Nautsch et al. [1] for an excellent and comprehensive
survey of existing work on privacy-preserving speaker and speech characteriza-
tion. Below we focus on what is most relevant for our work, namely (1) existing
approaches to speech classification that are based on MPC, and (2) existing
work on secure inference with a trained deep learning model based on MPC, for
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applications other than speech or speaker characterization. To the best of our
knowledge, none of the existing work in category (1) is based on deep learning,
while none of the existing work in (2) has been applied to 1-dimensional CNNs
in general, or to speech classification in specific. This is the gap we close in our
work.
(1) MPC-based speech classification. In the clear, i.e. without con-
cern for user privacy, there are several successful ML approaches for speech
classification. Well-known ML work horses that gained popularity in the 1980s
and 1990s are hidden Markov models (HMMs) and Gaussian mixture models
(GMMs). The earliest work on privacy-preserving speech classification based
on MPC focused on the design of cryptographic protocols to make training and
inference with HMMs and GMMs secure in the semi-honest setting [11, 12, 13].
These early approaches were based on homomorphic encryption (HE) and slow
because of the large computation costs. Porteˆlo et al. substantially improved
upon this computational cost by using Garbled Circuits (GC) instead of HE,
in a GMM based protocol specifically for speaker verification, i.e. voice based
authentication [14].
While up until a decade ago, HMM used to be popular for speech processing
and audio classification, more recently deep learning has been acknowledged as
a state-of-the-art ML approach in this field [17, 18]. The CNN approach that
we follow in this paper adheres to the latter.
(2) MPC-based classification with CNNs. The problem of doing
privacy-preserving inference with trained neural networks has received a lot
of attention in the literature recently, and a variety of MPC-based approaches
and frameworks have been proposed. Most of these, including MiniONN [19],
SecureML [20], DeepSecure [21], Chameleon [22], Gazelle [23], Quotient [24],
XONN [25], and Delphi [26], are limited to the semi-honest security setting,
i.e. they guarantee that no information is leaked as long as the parties honestly
execute the protocols. CrypTFlow [27], based in part on SecureNN [28], is an
interesting recent addition to the growing body of MPC-based secure inference
frameworks. In addition to the semi-honest case, CrypTFlow also guarantees
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security in the malicious case, where parties may deviate arbitrarily from the
protocols. To this end, CrypTFlow uses a combination of cryptographic tech-
niques and secure hardware (Intel SGX). To the best of our knowledge, SecureQ8
[6] is the only work so far on MPC-based secure inference with trained CNNs
in both the semi-honest and malicious case that does not require special se-
cure hardware. In this paper, we adapt the work that was done in SecureQ8
for 2-dimensional CNNs (image classification) to 1-dimensional CNNs (speech
classification).
For completeness, we mention the research by Dias et al. [29] and Teixeira et
al. [30] who combine neural networks with (leveled) fully homomorphic encryp-
tion (FHE) for privacy-preserving detection of emotion and of voice-affecting
diseases such as a cold, a depression, and Parkinson’s disease. The main dif-
ference between their work, which builds on Cryptonets [31], and ours, is that
in [29, 30], Alice encrypts her input feature vector and sends it to Bob, who
uses FHE to perform computations over the encrypted data, while in our MPC
approach both Alice and Bob perform computations. FHE comes with lower
communication costs than MPC, at the expense of substantially higher com-
putation costs. Since FHE-based secure neural network inference relies on ap-
proximating operations by polynomials, there is a degradation in accuracy. In
our MPC based approach for secure CNN inference, there is no accuracy loss.
Dias et al. [29] use a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) with two hidden layers (no
convolutional layers) that achieves a ∼80% accuracy for a binary classification
task of labeling recordings as neutral or angry when no encryption is used. Our
MPC-based CNN approach has 96.6% accuracy for a multi-class classification
with eight emotion labels. Based on runtime results reported in [31], in addition
to being more accurate, the approach that we propose in this paper is faster
than the approach of Dias et al. [29], even for active security (i.e. malicious
parties), and an estimated two orders of magnitude faster for passive security
(i.e. semi-honest parties).
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3. Methods
Our approach for private speech characterization consists of two phases:
first the ML model training is done by Bob in the clear, i.e. on training data
that is not encrypted (see Section 3.1), then the inference with the trained
model is performed securely using a MPC-based solution (see Section 3.2). In
the secure inference steps, all computations are done over encrypted data and
model parameters, meaning that Alice does not learn anything about Bob’s
model weights or training examples, while Bob does not learn anything about
Alice’s speech signal.
3.1. Data preprocessing and neural network architecture
3.1.1. Data preprocessing and feature extraction
Our assumption is that Bob has a set of audio files (speech signals) that
are each annotated with a label, and he uses these to train an ML model that
can assign a correct label to a previously unseen audio file (Alice’s input). It is
common in speech processing for classifiers to work on features extracted from
the speech signal as opposed to on the raw speech signal itself. These features
and the software to extract them are widely known and publicly available. It is
for example very common to convert a speech signal into a sequence of feature
vectors of mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC) [32] that are extracted
from sliding windows of consecutive speech. We assume that Bob converts each
audio file from his training data into a sequence of r feature vectors, each of
length m, and subsequently averages them to obtain one feature vector of length
m per audio file. Similarly, Alice converts her speech signal into a sequence of
r vectors of MFCC coefficients, averages them, and uses the resulting feature
vector of length m as her input to the protocol for speech classification (see
Figure 1). As we demonstrate in Section 4, we can train highly accurate ML
models for speech classification based on these extracted feature vectors. That
in itself is clear evidence that the feature vectors contain meaningful, private
information that needs to be kept private during inference, as we do with the
technique described in Section 3.2.
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3.1.2. MPC-friendly CNN model architecture
We propose the use of a standard, MPC-friendly CNN model architecture.
By “MPC-friendly” we mean that the operations to be performed when doing
inference with the trained CNN are chosen purposefully among operations for
which efficient MPC protocols exist. A standard CNN contains one or more
blocks that each have a convolutional layer, followed by an activation layer, and
an optional pooling layer.
The difference between the more commonly used 2-dimensional CNNs on
one hand, and the 1-dimensional CNNs that we use in this paper, is that in a 1-
dimensional CNN, convolutional operations are performed across one dimension.
In 2-dimensional CNNs, the shape of the input of a convolutional layer is defined
in terms of its height H, width M, and number of channels D. In a 1-dimensional
CNN, the height is always 1, hence the input X is a D ×M matrix, as illustrated
in Figure 2. A convolutional layer is defined by F filters (kernels), each of size D
× L, with L the width of the filters. In addition, for each filter Wi, i = 1, . . . ,F,
the convolutional layer contains a bias term bi ∈ R. The values of the weights
in the filters and the bias are, as usual, learned during training. The output
produced by a convolutional layer with F filters Wi of width L, when applied to
an input X of size D × M, is a matrix Z of size F × M, which is computed as:
for i← 1 to F
for j ← 1 to M
Zi,j ← X[j : j + L− 1]Wi + bi
(1)
In this pseudocode, X[j : j + L − 1] denotes the submatrix of X that consists
of column j through column j + L − 1 of X,5 while  denotes the Frobenius
inner product (a generalization to matrices of the dot product of vectors). The
computation of the ith row of Z is illustrated in Figure 2. In privacy-preserving
speech classification, the input X into the first convolutional layer is known to
Alice, while the values of Wi and bi are known to Bob. We address in Section
5We assume a stride of 1, and zero padding, which means that L− 1 columns with 0s are
appended to X to avoid the index from running out of bounds.
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input X filter Wi bias bi
D

2 4 3 0 1 2
3 1 6 8 1 3
1 0 2 5 7 4
2 7 1 2 3 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
M

1 2 0
−1 0 1
0 −3 −1
3 −2 −4︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
+2 = 1 19 −35 −30 1 4
Figure 2: Illustration of 1-dimensional convolution
3.2 how in this case Z can be computed, and subsequent CNN operations can
be performed, without the need for Alice to disclose X and without the need
for Bob to disclose Wi and bi.
As the activation function in the convolutional blocks, we choose the RELU
function f(z) = max(0, z), which means that all negative values are mapped
to 0. For the pooling layer, we select average pooling instead of max pooling,
because in an MPC setting additions and division by a publicly known constant
(as is needed to compute an average) are computationally less expensive than
performing comparisons (which would be needed to find a maximum). Applying
RELU and average pooling with size 2 to the output in Figure 2 would yield
[10, 0, 2.5].
The stacked convolutional blocks are followed by a dense layer, the appli-
cation of which comes down to a product of two matrices. The activation
function on the final layer is typically a logistic function (for binary classifica-
tion problems) or a softmax operation (for multi-class classification problems).
The output of the softmax operation is a probability for each of the possible
class labels; the label with the highest probability is returned as the final result.
While the use of a softmax function is important during training, we note that
during inference it can be replaced by an argmax function. Indeed, the softmax
operation does not change the ordering among the logits, i.e. the values that are
passed into it from the previous layer. Argmax is computationally much less
expensive to compute in a privacy-preserving manner. Finally, any dropout lay-
ers that are used to improve the training process, are omitted during inference,
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which means that we do not need to include MPC-based protocols for these
layers when doing secure inference (see Section 3.2). We refer to Section 4 for
more details about the exact CNN architecture that we used in our experiments.
3.2. Privacy-preserving inference with a 1-dimensional CNN
After giving a high level overview in Section 3.2.1 of the security settings that
we consider, we recall the principles of MPC based on secret sharing in Sections
3.2.2 and 3.2.3, and the particular MPC schemes that we use in this paper.
This includes an explanation of how Alice and Bob can perform additions and
multiplications on integers even if they only have so-called shares of the integers
instead of the actual values. Since in speech classification, Alice’s MFCC feature
values and Bob’s model parameters are real numbers, in Section 3.2.4 we explain
how Alice and Bob use techniques from quantization of neural networks to
convert their floating-point data into integers before they execute the MPC
protocols. Next we explain in Section 3.2.5 how Alice and Bob can use an MPC
scheme to perform privacy-preserving speech classification.
3.2.1. Security settings
There exist a variety of MPC schemes, designed for different numbers of
participants and offering various levels of security that correspond to different
threat models. In the scenario of privacy-preserving speech classification that
we consider in this work, there are two participants, Alice and Bob, and one of
them may be corrupted. When Alice and Bob execute a secure MPC protocol
between themselves to perform the privacy-preserving speech classification, as
illustrated in Figure 1, one corrupted party means that we are in the so-called
scenario of dishonest majority. In general, a dishonest majority setting is one
where an adversary can corrupt a fraction of the protocol participants that is
equal to or greater than 1/2. In our two-party computation (2PC) setting this
means that each party can only trust itself and assumes that the other party may
be corrupted. We describe the MPC protocols that we use for the dishonenst
majority setting in Section 3.2.2.
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Figure 3: Oblivious speech classification as a three-party computation (3PC) problem in
the honest majority setting (Section 3.2.3). Alice and Bob outsource the computations to 3
servers.
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MPC protocols in the dishonest majority setting such as the 2PC scenario
from Figure 1 are much more computationally expensive than protocols in an
honest majority setting, i.e. when more than half of the protocol participants are
honest. Therefore, many works on privacy-preserving inference have considered
the setting in which Alice and Bob outsource the secure computations to a set
of 3 or more servers, of which a majority is assumed to honest (e.g., [6, 22,
27, 28]). In this work we also evaluate the performance of privacy-preserving
speech classification in the scenario in which Alice and Bob outsource the secure
classification to 3 servers (three-party computation, 3PC), one of which can be
corrupted. The protocols that we use for this scenario, which is illustrated in
Figure 3, are described in Section 3.2.3.
Furthermore, a party can be corrupted in different ways. In the passive
security setting (also known as semi-honest or honest-but-curious adversaries),
the corrupted parties follow the specified protocol instructions, but they may
try to learn additional information (i.e., information other than what can be
inferred from their specified inputs and outputs) from the messages exchanged
during the protocol execution. Secure MPC protocols prevent such information
leakage. In the active security setting (also known as malicious adversaries), the
parties may deviate from the protocol instructions in arbitrary ways, for instance
by providing incorrect values on purpose. In this case, secure MPC protocols
should prevent information leakage and detect devious behavior. Protection
against such a stronger threat model comes at a higher computational cost.
In this paper, we evaluate multiple MPC schemes and their efficiency-security-
accuracy trade-off for privacy-preserving speech classification.
3.2.2. Secret sharing-based MPC for dishonest majority
In the MPC schemes that we use, all computations are done on integers,
modulo an integer q. The modulo q is a hyperparameter that defines the alge-
braic structure in which the computations are done, which in turn has a direct
effect on the efficiency of the MPC protocols for different tasks. In Section 4,
we evaluate MPC schemes where q is a prime number as well as where q is a
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power of 2.
Furthermore, all MPC schemes for the dishonest majority scenario that we
use are based on additive sharing. A value x in Zq = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} is secret
shared between Alice and Bob by picking uniformly random values x1, x2 ∈ Zq
such that
x1 + x2 = x mod q. (2)
Equation (2) expresses that x1 and x2 are additive shares of x (which are de-
livered to Alice and Bob, respectively). Note that no information about the
secret value x is revealed by any of the individual shares x1 or x2, but the secret
shared value can be trivially revealed by combining both shares. As we explain
below, the parties Alice and Bob can jointly perform computations on numbers
by performing computations on their own shares, without the parties learning
the values of the numbers themselves.6
Passive security. For protocols in the passive security setting, we use [[x]]
as a shorthand for a secret sharing of x, i.e. [[x]] = (x1, x2). Given secret shared
values [[x]] = (x1, x2) and [[y]] = (y1, y2), and a constant c, Alice and Bob can
jointly perform the following operations, each by doing only local computations
on their own shares:
• Addition of a constant (z = x+ c): Alice and Bob compute (x1 + c, x2). Note
that Alice adds c to her share x1, while Bob keeps the same share x2. This
operation will be denoted by [[z]]← [[x]] + c.
• Addition (z = x+y): Alice and Bob compute (x1+y1, x2+y2) by adding their
local shares of x and y. This operation will be denoted by [[z]]← [[x]] + [[y]].
• Multiplication by a constant (z = c ·x): Alice and Bob compute (c ·x1, c ·x2)
by multiplying their local shares of x by c. This operation will be denoted by
[[z]]← c[[x]].
The basic operation that is missing in the list above is the multiplication of
6We often omit the modular notation for conciseness.
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secret shared values [[x]] and [[y]]. This is done using a so called multiplication
triple [33], which is a triple of secret shared values [[a]], [[b]], [[c]], such that a and
b are uniformly random values in Zq and c = a ·b. We explain later on how Alice
and Bob obtain such multiplication triples from an offline phase. Given that
they have a multiplication triple, Alice and Bob can compute [[d]] = [[x]] − [[a]]
and [[e]] = [[y]] − [[b]], and, in a communication step, open d and e by disclos-
ing their respective shares of d and e to each other. Next, they can compute
[[z]] = [[c]] + d · [[b]] + e · [[b]] + d · e, which is equal to [[x · y]]. Each multiplica-
tion requires a fresh multiplication triple; generating sufficient multiplication
triples contributes substantially to the computational cost of MPC protocols.
This secure multiplication protocol can be generalized for the multiplication of
element-wise secret shared matrices (for efficiency gains) using matrix multipli-
cation triples, and keeps its security even when composed with other arbitrary
building blocks [34, 35].
Active security. In the case of active security, the main idea to prevent
the players from cheating is to use a Message Authentication Code (MAC). We
focus first on the case of a prime field Zq, with q a prime number. To verify
the correctness of the computations, Alice and Bob each have a share of a fixed
MAC key α ∈ Zq, i.e. Alice has α1 and Bob has α2 such that α1 + α2 = α
mod q. When a value x is secret shared between Alice and Bob, they also get
shares m1 and m2, respectively, of a MAC such that
m1 +m2 = x · α mod q (3)
Equation (3) is the so-called MAC relation. If at any point Alice and Bob
need to open a secret shared number, i.e. make its value x known, then Alice first
reveals x1 to Bob, while Bob reveals x2 to Alice, so that they both can compute
x = x1 + x2. Next, to verify that the MAC relation holds, Alice commits the
value of m1 − x · α1 while Bob commits the value of m2 − x · α2, and they
subsequently reveal these values to each other so that they can both verify that
they add up to 0. The purpose of the commit phase before the reveal phase is
to prevent the parties from changing their value based on what the other party
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reveals.7
We also use [[x]] as a shorthand for a secret sharing of x in the case of active
security, but in this case [[x]] = (x1, x2,m1,m2). Given secret shared values
[[x]] = (x1, x2,m1,m2) and [[y]] = (y1, y2, n1, n2), and a constant c, Alice and
Bob can jointly perform with only local computations the same operations as
before:
• Addition of a constant (z = x + c): Alice and Bob compute (x1 + c, x2, α1 ·
c + m1, α2 · c + m2). Note that the MAC relation remains satisfied, since
α1 · c+m1 +α2 · c+m2 = (α1 +α2) · c+ (m1 +m2) = α · c+x ·α = α · (x+ c).
• Addition (z = x+y): Alice and Bob compute (x1+y1, x2+y2,m1+n1,m2+n2)
by adding their local shares of x and y. The MAC relation remains trivially
satisfied.
• Multiplication by a constant (z = c · x): Alice and Bob compute (c · x1, c ·
x2, c ·m1, c ·n2) by multiplying their local shares of x by c. The MAC relation
remains trivially satisfied.
The notations we use for the operations are the same as in the passive
security case. In the case of the protocol with active security using binary fields
Zq, with q a power of 2, there are a few additional technical details regarding
the MAC, but the MPC protocol provides the same set of basic local operations
that are described above. We refer interested readers to [36] for further details.
In the case of active security, the multiplication of secret shared values can
also be performed as described above using multiplication triples, but the mul-
tiplication triples must be generated together with the respective MACs.
Additionally, since in the case of active security all secret shared values x
that are used in the computations must contain a corresponding MAC (defined
by m1 and m2 as in Equation 3), a procedure for the parties to obtain a MAC
7In practice the verification of all MAC relations are performed in an aggregated, much
more efficient way right before the end of the protocol.
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for their inputs must be used. This is done as follows. During the offline phase
a secret sharing [[r]] (with a MAC) of a random value r ∈ Zq is generated and
distributed to Alice and Bob. If Alice has an input a ∈ Zq, the secret sharing
[[r]] is opened towards her and she sends c = a− r to Bob. They then compute
the secret sharing [[a]]← [[r]] + c, which contains a MAC. Note that the value c
is uniformly random and independent from a, and therefore does not reveal any
information to Bob.
Generation of Multiplication Triples and Random Values During
the Offline Phase. For performance reasons, modern MPC schemes are nor-
mally divided in two phases: the offline and online phases. The offline phase
only performs computations that are independent from the specific inputs of the
parties to the protocol (Alice’s speech signal and Bob’s trained model param-
eters), and therefore can be executed far before the inputs are fixed. Modern
MPC protocols try to perform as much of the computation as possible in the of-
fline phase, so that the online phase can be faster, improving the responsiveness
of the MPC solution.
In the case of the secret-shared based schemes that we consider, the compu-
tationally heavy operations are the generation of the multiplication triples and
of the random values, and both of them are independent of the specific inputs of
parties and can be delegated to the offline phase, whose main purpose is to gen-
erate these values. The parties can jointly generate them using techniques such
as homomorphic encryption or oblivious transfer. During the online phase the
parties only need to perform basic arithmetic operations, whose computational
costs are quite small.
MPC Schemes. Table 1 contains an overview of the MPC schemes that
we use in this paper. The MPC schemes for passive security provide protec-
tion against semi-honest adversaries, while the MPC schemes for active security
provide protection against malicious adversaries. The distinction between the
underlying algebraic structures Zp and Z2k is meaningful because of its poten-
tial impact on the efficiency of the protocols. We briefly describe each MPC
scheme for the dishonest majority scenario here (the ones for the honest majority
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dishonest majority Zp Z2k
passive security SEMI SEMI2K
active security MASCOT SPDZ2K
honest majority Zp Z2k
passive security REPP REP2K
active security MAL-REPP BRAIN
Table 1: Overview of MPC schemes according to threat model and algebraic structure
scenario are described in Section 3.2.3):
• In the case of active security using a prime field, we use MASCOT [37].
It is a protocol that introduced an improved offline phase based on oblivious
transfer techniques to generate the necessary values for the online phase of the
SPDZ protocol [38] (which is the online phase described above). Note that
the offline phase is also performed between Alice and Bob, and one of them
may act maliciously. Therefore it is necessary to use a series of mechanisms
(such as consistency checking, privacy amplification techniques, and oblivious
transfer checks) in order to guarantee that correct multiplication triples and
random values are generated and that nothing about them leaks to Alice or
Bob. We point interested readers to [37] for further details about how these
values are generated in the offline phase.
• In the case of active security using a binary field, we use SPDZ2K [36]. It
adapts the offline phase of MASCOT to generate multiplication triples and
random values for a binary field, which are then consumed by its online phase
(which is an adaptation of SPDZ to the setting of binary fields). See [36] for
further details.
• For passive security we use SEMI for the case of prime fields, and SEMI2K
for binary fields. Both schemes generate multiplication triples using tech-
niques based on oblivious transfer. SEMI is a cut-down version of MAS-
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COT, which eliminates all the additional machinery of MASCOT that is
only necessary for the case of active security (such as consistency checking,
privacy amplification techniques, the generation and use of message authen-
tication codes, and oblivious transfer checks). Similarly, SEMI2K is a cut-
down version of SPDZ2K to focus on passive security.
Many previous works on privacy-preserving machine learning have assumed
the existence of a trusted initializer (e.g., [39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45]), who
pre-distributes correlated randomness to the protocol participants at a setup
phase and does not participate in any other part of the protocol execution.
Note that such a trusted initializer would completely eliminate the need of
executing the offline phase of the above protocols, as the trusted initializer can
pre-distribute all necessary multiplication triples and random values to Alice
and Bob. However, we are interested in evaluating the performance of secure
classification in the setting in which no such trusted initializer is available to
the model and data owners and they have to execute the complete two-party
computation solution between themselves.
3.2.3. Secret sharing-based MPC for honest majority
In the setting with 3 computing servers and at most 1 corruption (i.e., honest
majority setting), we use MPC schemes based on replicated secret sharing, which
allow much faster solutions than in the two-party setting.
In a replicated secret sharing scheme, a value x in Zq = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} is
secret shared among servers S1, S2 and S3 by picking uniformly random values
x1, x2, x3 ∈ Zq such that
x1 + x2 + x3 = x mod q, (4)
and distributing (x1, x2) to S1, (x2, x3) to S2 and (x3, x1) to S3. Note that no
single server can obtain any information about x given its share. We also use
[[x]] as a shorthand for a secret sharing of x in this case.
Passive security. As in the case of additive secret sharings, the 3 parties
can easily perform the following operations through carrying out local computa-
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tions: addition of a constant, addition of secret shared values, and multiplication
by a constant. The biggest advantage of this replicated secret sharing scheme is
that it enables a more efficient procedure for multiplying secret shared values.
When multiplying x · y = (x1 + x2 + x3)(y1 + y2 + y3), the servers can locally
perform the following computations: S1 computes z1 = x1 ·y1+x1 ·y2+x2 ·y1, S2
computes z2 = x2 ·y2+x2 ·y3+x3 ·y2 and S3 computes z3 = x3 ·y3+x3 ·y1+x1 ·y3.
After performing these local computations, the servers obtain an additive secret
sharing of x · y without needing any interactions. Next, they just need to con-
vert from the additive secret sharing representation back to a replicated secret
sharing representation, so that it is possible to perform more multiplications in
the same way. In order to securely do this conversion, the servers obtain an
additive secret sharing of 0 by picking uniformly random u1, u2, u3 such that
u1 + u2 + u3 = 0, which can be locally done with computational security by
using pseudorandom functions, and Si locally computes vi = zi + ui. Finally,
S1 sends v1 to S3, S2 sends v2 to S1, and S3 sends v3 to S2, enabling the servers
S1, S2 and S3 to get the replicated secret shares (v1, v2), (v2, v3), and (v3, v1),
respectively, of the value v = x · y. Note that for performing the multiplication
of secret shared values, each server only needs to send a single ring element to
one other server, and no expensive public-key encryption operations (such as
homomorphic encryption or oblivious transfer) are required. This MPC scheme
was introduced by Araki et al. [46]; we refer to the original paper for further
details. Referring back to the second part of Table 1, we denote the version
working on a prime field by REPP, and the version working on a binary field
by REP2K.
Active security. In the case of malicious adversaries, the MPC scheme
MAL-REPP that we consider for prime fields uses the approach introduced
by Lindell and Nof [47] of generating multiplication triples optimistically in the
offline phase (i.e., running the multiplication protocol that is secure against
semi-honest adversaries), performing the triple verification via sacrificing, and
then using Beaver’s protocol for multiplication of secret shared values. For more
details, we refer to [47]. In the case of binary fields, the MPC scheme BRAIN
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that we use was recently proposed by Eerikson et al. [48]; we evaluate the option
with preprocessing for generation of the multiplication triples that is available in
MP-SPDZ. Note that in the three-party computation setting, the generation of
the multiplication triples does not require any expensive public-key encryption
operations.
3.2.4. Quantization
MPC based on secret sharing, as explained in Section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, pro-
vides a mechanism to perform secure computations on integers modulo q. The
parameter values of a trained neural network, i.e. the values in the filters in the
convolutional layers, the weights on the dense layers etc., are natively real num-
bers and need to be converted to integers. For this conversion process, we lever-
age existing research on quantization of neural networks. In deep learning, the
conversion of floating-point (FP) data in the network to integers (INT) is stud-
ied as an effective way to shrink the model size and to accelerate computation,
e.g. on edge devices with limited memory and computational power [49]. The
use of quantization is growing in popularity in research on privacy-preserving
deep learning as well, for instance in XONN [25], where neural network parame-
ters are restricted to take binary values {−1, 1}, in Quotient [24] with ternarized
network weights in {−1, 0, 1}, and in SecureQ8 [6] where network weights are
reduced to 8-bit integers. We adhere to the latter.
Quantization allows the ability to represent a set of real numbers {α1, ...., αn}
∈ R as a set of integers {a1, ...., an} ∈ Zq. In this work we use the 8-bit quan-
tization method implemented in TensorFlow Lite,8 which was designed in the
work of Jacob et al. [50] and used previously in Secure8Q [6]. Let us define the
dequantization function
dequantm,z : {0, . . . , 28 − 1} → R
a 7→ m · (a− z)
where m ∈ R is a scale and z ∈ {0, . . . , 28−1} is a zero-point. The quantization
8https://www.tensorflow.org/lite/performance/quantization_spec
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function quantm,z : D → {0, . . . , 28 − 1} with domain D = {α ∈ R : −m · z ≤
α ≤ m ·(28−1−z)} is then defined for an input α ∈ D by picking the number α′
in the image of dequantm,z that is the closest
9 to α and setting quantm,z(α) = a
such that dequantm,z(a) = α
′.
The quantization hyperparametersm and z are not the same across the entire
neural network. The range of real values in the neural network may differ from
one layer to the next. To ensure that all relevant real values are in D, a pair m, z
is chosen “per tensor” in the neural network (in our case of 1-dimensional CNNs,
this means “per matrix”, see Section 3.1.2). Suitable values for m and z are
determined automatically with a post-training integer quantization algorithm
on the trained CNN and artificially generated input data.
Dot product is an important operation in CNNs, both for the convolutional
layers and the dense layers. We use the same method as SecureQ8 [6] to compute
dot products by using only integer arithmetic to sum the products of the vector
elements (in Zq for q  28) and a single fixed-point multiplication to adjust
to the proper scale for the output. Adding bias is handled by setting the scale
of the bias representation to be the same as the scale of the output, and its
zero-point to 0. Layers that only involve comparisons, such as RELU, can be
directly implemented on the quantized values if they share the same scale and
zero-point.
When a fixed-point multiplication is performed, it is necessary to truncate
the result by a number of bits equal to the number of bits that is used to rep-
resent the fractional part, so that the output does not use twice as many bits
to represent the fractional part as the inputs. In the case of prime fields this
is done using either the deterministic truncation protocol of Catrina and De
Hoogh [51] or the probabilistic truncation protocol of Catrina and Saxena [52].
In the probabilistic protocol, the probabilities that a number is rounded up or
down are proportional to its distance to those bounds. The probabilistic trunca-
tion protocol eliminates a lot of invocations of the underlying secure comparison
9Breaking distance ties in favor of the smallest number.
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protocol, and therefore improves the efficiency. On the other hand, the proba-
bilistic truncation affects negatively the accuracy of the secure classification as
we will show in Section 4. In the case of binary fields, the truncation is done
using the adaptations of the above deterministic and probabilistic truncation
protocols that were introduced by Dalskov et al. [6]. In the procedures in which
the amount of bits to be truncated needs to be kept secret, we use the protocol
of Dalskov et al. [6] to perform deterministic truncation by a secret value.
We refer interested readers to [6, 50] for further details.
3.2.5. Using an MPC scheme to securely classify
Classification of Alice’s speech signal vector X with Bob’s model can, at a
high level of abstraction, be thought of as the evaluation of a function f(X, θ)
that depends both on Alice’s input X and on proprietary model parameters
θ that were learned during training and that are only known to Bob. In the
following description, we focus on the case of two-party computation for con-
creteness, but the case of outsourced three-party computation can be handled
similarly. Designing a secure solution based on MPC for the classification comes
down to representing the function that needs to be privately computed using
the basic operations that are provided by the underlying MPC scheme (i.e.,
the addition and multiplication gates). Once this representation is found, the
parties evaluate it gate by gate using existing procedures for private addition
and private multiplication as explained in Section 3.2.2. This classification is
performed during the online phase of protocol, consuming the necessary values
that were generated during the offline phase, i.e. the multiplication triples that
are needed for multiplication of secret shared values, as well as the random val-
ues that are needed for Alice to secret share her speech signal vector X, and
for Bob to secret share his model parameters θ. During the secure classification
process, Alice and Bob jointly go through the following steps:
1. Input. Alice secret shares her speech signal vector X, and Bob secret shares
his model parameters θ using the technique for secret sharing described in
Section 3.2.2.
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2. Convolutional layer. In this step, Alice and Bob need to compute a secret
sharing [[Z]] of the output of first convolutional layer, starting from the secret
shared input [[X]] and the secret shared model parameters [[θ]]. As indicated
in the pseudocode in (1), to this end they need to perform Frobenius inner
products (a generalization of dot product to matrices) and add bias terms.
This boils down to performing multiplications and additions of values that
are secret shared among Alice and Bob, namely Alice’s speech signal vector
[[X]] and Bob’s model parameters [[Wi]] and [[bi]] (which are part of [[θ]]). We
refer to Section 3.2.2 and 3.2.4 for a description of how these operations are
performed over secret shares.
3. RELU activation layer. In this step, Alice and Bob replace all negative values
in [[Z]] by zeros. This is done directly in the quantized values using a secure
comparison protocol derived from Catrina and De Hoogh [51], followed by a
secure multiplication to either keep the original value or replace it by zero in
an oblivious way.
4. Average pooling layer. Average pooling with a window size of P means that
in every row in Z, each (non-overlapping) block of P adjacent elements is
replaced by one cell, with the average value of the original block. The re-
sulting matrix Z ′ is smaller than the original matrix Z. The values in Z
are secret shared between Alice and Bob. To do average pooling, Alice and
Bob first add the values in a block of Z by adding their own shares of these
values. Next Alice and Bob need to divide the resulting sum [[s]] by P, to
yield the average. The window size P is a hyperparameter of the model that
is known by Bob. Bob secret shares the value of hyperparameter P with
Alice, similarly to how he shares the regular parameter values in step 1. For
secure division of [[s]] by [[P]], Alice and Bob use an iterative algorithm that
is well known in the MPC literature [52]. This is the protocol for secure
division used for the experimental results in Section 4. There is room for
optimization in the runtime if Bob is willing to leak the window size P to
Alice. P is part of the neural network architecture, just like the size L of the
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filters in the convolutional layers. If both Alice and Bob know the value of
hyperparameter P, then there is no need for them to execute a protocol for
secure division, as they can simply multiply [[s]] by the constant 1/P without
the need to communicate with each other.
5. More convolutional blocks. Alice and Bob repeat steps 2-3-4 as many times
as needed, depending on the neural network architecture.
6. Dense layer. In a CNN, the output of the last convolutional block is flattened
into a vector x of length d. Alice and Bob can each flatten their own shares
of the values to construct [[x]]. Next, [[x]] needs to be multiplied with a d× o
matrix [[Wd]] that contains the weights of the dense layer, and a bias term
[[b]] needs to be added. [[Wd]] and [[b]] have already been provided by Bob as
inputs in Step 1. The output of the dense layer is a vector y of length o.
Alice and Bob jointly compute [[y]] by performing dot products and adding
the bias term as explained in Section 3.2.2-3.2.4.
7. Output layer. The class label inferred by the CNN is the index corresponding
to the largest value in y. In the final step, Alice and Bob obtain a secret shar-
ing [[c]] of the class label by running a secure argmax protocol, which can be
straightforwardly constructed using the above mentioned secure comparison
protocol.
4. Results
Experimental setup: all benchmark and accuracy tests were completed on
co-located c5d.4xlarge (VM1) and c5d.24xlarge (VM2) AWS virtual machines.
We benchmarked our tests on two separate performance level machines to have
a comparison of realistic runtimes today and into the future. A c5d.4xlarge
virtual machine contains 16 cores, 32 GiB of memory, and up to a 10 Gbps link
between each virtual machine. The c5d.24xlarge virtual machine represents
computing power that could potentially be used more widespread in the future.
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Line (4), (11), and (12) in the code are only
relevant for training, not for inference
(1) model = Sequential()
(2) model.add(Conv1D(128,5,padding=’same’,
input shape=(40,1)))
(3) model.add(Activation(’relu’))
(4) model.add(Dropout(0.1))
(5) model.add(AveragePooling1D(pool size=(4)))
(6) model.add(Conv1D(128, 5,padding=’same’,))
(7) model.add(Activation(’relu’))
(8) model.add(Dropout(0.1))
(9) model.add(Flatten())
(10) model.add(Dense(8))
(11) model.add(Activation(’softmax’))
(12) opt = keras.optimizers.rmsprop(lr=0.00005,
rho=0.9, epsilon=None, decay=0.0)
Figure 4: CNN architecture and Keras code snippet used to train the model.
This virtual machine contains 96 cores, 192 GiB of memory, and a 25 Gbps
connection speed between virtual machines.
4.1. Data preprocessing and model training
We evaluated the proposed approach in a use case for emotion recognition
from audio, using audio files from the RAVDESS data set [16]. The data set
contains 4,948 audio files with a length of ∼3.5 sec each. Each audio file is
annotated with one of eight emotion labels: neutral (398), calm (777), sad (744),
happy (756), fearful (767), disgust (391), angry (726), and surprise (389). We
extracted vectors of m = 40 MFCC features from each audio file with the librosa
library [53], with the default settings for all other parameters, and averaged them
to obtain one 40-dimensional feature vector for each audio file.
We used a CNN architecture with two convolutional blocks. Both convolu-
tional blocks have RELU activation, and the first one has an average pooling
layer for downsampling. The convolutional blocks are followed by a dense layer
with softmax activation. A Keras10 code snippet with more details is included in
Figure 4. Figure 5 shows accuracy curves when holding out 33% of the data as
test data and training on the rest; the quantized trained model achieves 96.6%
10https://github.com/fchollet/keras.io/
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Figure 5: Train and test accuracy curves of CNN for emotion detection on RAVDESS data.
The trained model obtains 96.6% accuracy on the test data.
accuracy on the test data. We used TensorFlow Lite’s post-training integer
quantization11 to convert all CNN model parameters to 8-bit integers.
4.2. Secure inference
To evaluate the accuracy and efficiency of the MPC schemes from Table 1 for
privacy-preserving emotion detection, we ran experiments with the quantized
trained model from Section 4.1 on the same held-out test set that was used for
Figure 5. For the binary field Z2k , a value k = 72 was used, while for the prime
field Zp a prime number p with bit length 64 was used.
Table 2 contains accuracy and runtime results obtained on two different
kinds of VMs in the case of two-party computation, while Table 3 contains
similar data for the case of three-party computation. As mentioned above, the
accuracy results were obtained by holding 33% of the data out as test data. The
classification runtimes are computed as an average over 10 inferences, and they
include the time needed for both the offline and the online phases. As expected,
the accuracy results are consistent across the VMs and the 2PC/3PC settings,
while the runtime differs.
11https://www.tensorflow.org/lite/performance/post_training_integer_quant
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Active Security Passive Security
VM Truncation Accuracy SPDZ2K MASCOT SEMI2K SEMI
VM1
Probabilistic 91.0% 250.9 sec 274.6 sec 27.6 sec 92.5 sec
Deterministic 96.6% 370.0 sec 316.4 sec 40.5 sec 112.3 sec
VM2
Probabilistic 91.0% 26.01 sec 28.36 sec 2.77 sec 9.56 sec
Deterministic 96.6% 33.30 sec 32.28 sec 4.17 sec 11.55 sec
Table 2: Accuracy and runtime results for privacy-preserving emotion detection in the dishon-
est majority, 2PC setting in which Alice and Bob perform the privacy-preserving classification
themselves. The accuracy results were obtained by holding 33% of the data out as test data.
The classification runtimes are computed as an average over 10 inferences.
First we observe that the accuracy results obtained with the deterministic
truncation protocol are the same as the accuracy results in-the-clear (96.6%,
see Section 4.1), while the probabilistic truncation protocol causes a significant
drop in accuracy to 91.0%. These numbers are interesting by themselves: while
Dalskov et al. [6] write that the use of a probabilistic truncation protocol may
hurt classification accuracy, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
evaluate and measure this drop in accuracy experimentally on a real-life data
set.
The absolute runtimes that we obtain are, even on the more modest VM,
an order of magnitude smaller (better) than the runtimes reported for image
classification in [6]. This is because our overall neural network architecture is
far more compact; the fact that we choose to use a 1-dimensional CNN instead
of a 2-dimensional CNN contributes to this gain in speed. Beyond that, our
runtime results are in line with what is reported in [6]. For the 2PC setting
(Table 2) we observe the following:
• The probabilistic truncation protocol allows faster secure inferences than the
deterministic truncation protocol. The price paid for this gain in speed, is a
loss in accuracy (in our data set, a loss of 5.6%).
• Among the MPC schemes for passive security, SEMI is 2-4x slower than
SEMI2K. Among the MPC schemes for active security, the difference in run-
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Active Security Passive Security
VM Truncation Accuracy BRAIN MAL-REPP REP2K REPP
VM1
Probabilistic 91.0% 10.16 sec 9.97 sec 1.24 sec 4.18 sec
Deterministic 96.6% 12.72 sec 12.44 sec 2.06 sec 4.86 sec
VM2
Probabilistic 91.0% 1.35 sec 1.32 sec 0.15 sec 0.52 sec
Deterministic 96.6% 1.61 sec 1.58 sec 0.26 sec 0.60 sec
Table 3: Accuracy and runtime results for privacy-preserving emotion detection in the honest
majority, 3PC setting in which Alice and Bob outsource the privacy-preserving classification
to be performed by 3 servers. The accuracy results were obtained by holding 33% of the data
out as test data. The classification runtimes are computed as an average over 10 inferences.
time between SPDZ2K and MASCOT is minor (one slightly better with the
deterministic truncation, the other slightly better with the probabilistic trun-
cation).
• SEMI2K (passive security) is around 7-10x faster than SPDZ2K/MASCOT
(active security). The price paid for this gain in speed is a weaker security
setting, in which it is assumed that the adversary tries to gain additional
information, but nevertheless follows the protocol specifications.
The protocols in the three-party outsourced computation setting with honest
majority execute between 16x and 29x faster than their counterparts in the two-
party computation setting. This is expected given the performance differences
between state-of-art MPC protocols in the 2PC with dishonest majority and
3PC with honest majority settings. Beyond that, we have that
• Among the MPC schemes for active security, MAL-REPP (which uses a
prime field) performs slightly better than BRAIN (which uses a binary
field) in all tests.
• On the other hand, among the MPC schemes for passive security, REP2K
outperforms REPP in all tests, running around 2-3x faster.
• REP2K executes around 6-9x faster than MAL-REPP.
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Considering passive security in both the 2PC and 3PC settings, performing
the secure classification using computations on a binary field is far more efficient
than using a prime field. On the other hand, in the active security setting, the
secure classification achieves a comparable running time on both binary and
prime fields, the winner depending on the number of parties running the MPC
scheme and the type of truncation. Note that, in the passive security setting
the overall procedures required for performing a multiplication of secret shared
values are far less complicated than in the active security setting, and in the
active security setting those procedures are more complicated in the case of
binary fields.
Towards deployment in a real-time privacy-preserving speech classification
application, the 3PC setting with 3 semi-honest computational servers is a very
viable option (Tabke 3). The gain in speed compared to the 2PC setting stems
from the use of cryptographic protocols that leverage the availability of 3 instead
of only 2 players to secret share the values with, and the removal of the need for
expensive public key encryption, rather than the availability of more hardware
in the form of a 3rd server. It is important to stress that, since the 3 servers only
receive shares of Alice’s and Bob’s information, the servers do not learn anything
about the speech signal nor the trained model parameters. This holds true as
long as not more than 1 of the 3 servers is corrupted. The 3PC setting is a good
fit for applications where the user (Alice) and the application developer (Bob)
have access to 3 reliable computational servers in the cloud, and the application
developer wants to offer a speech classification service without becoming liable
for invading the user’s privacy.
In settings where there is no configuration available of 3 computational
servers with an honest majority, and where each party can only trust itself,
one can resort to the MPC schemes from the 2PC setting at a higher runtime
cost 2. These may be suitable for sensitive applications where real-time speech
classification is not a requirement, such as healthcare applications or empathy
based AI systems where one can afford several seconds of even half a minute to
detect a disease or the user’s general mood in a privacy-preserving manner.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented the first privacy-preserving approach to
deep learning based speech classification that is provably secure. To this end,
we have proposed the first application of privacy-preserving classification with 1-
dimensional CNNs based on Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC). In terms
of privacy, MPC is very reliable: other than the result of the classification
(which can be selectively revealed to the model owner, data owner, or a third
party depending on the application), no information about the speech signal
or the trained model parameters is leaked to any participant of the protocol.
When performing oblivious speech classification, the price paid for keeping the
data and the model private, is an increase in computational cost and runtime.
Our results answer a question that has remained open in the literature thus
far, namely whether MPC based protocols are efficient enough to enable highly
accurate real-time speech recognition as would be needed for instance for dig-
ital voice assistants such as Apple’s Siri, Amazon’s Alexa, Google Home, and
Microsoft’s Cortana. Our results show that this is clearly within reach.
In our experiments for a passive security setting, i.e. with semi-honest parties
who follow the instructions of the cryptographic protocols, an audio file of 3.5 sec
is classified with high accuracy in 0.26 sec, and in 0.15 sec with lower accuracy.
These results were obtained with a CNN that we optimized for high accuracy
as well as high efficiency in the MPC setting, through deliberate design choices
in the CNN architecture, and the use of quantization. We ran the protocols in
MP-SPDZ, an existing framework for MPC that is not optimized in any specific
way for speech classification. That means that, in addition to the optimization
efforts we made in this paper on the machine learning side, there is room to bring
the secure inference runtimes down even further by optimizations on the MPC
side, for instance by replacing the division algorithm in the average pooling layer
by multiplication with a constant.
The fastest results mentioned above are obtained when Alice and Bob out-
source the computations to 3 semi-honest servers (3PC). As long as these servers
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do not collude with each other, they do not learn anything about Alice’s speech
signal or about Bob’s trained model parameters. We have also included scenar-
ios with stronger security assumptions in our study, namely, in increasing order
of runtime: malicious adversaries with an honest majority (3PC), semi-honest
adversaries with a dishonest majority (2PC), and malicious adversaries with a
dishonest majority (2PC). Actively secure protocols remain secure even if one
of the parties is a malicious adversary who deviates from the protocol specifica-
tion. This makes these protocols most suitable for sensitive applications, even
if they come at a notably higher computational cost.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Marcel Keller for making the MP-SPDZ
framework available, and for his assistance in the use of the framework.
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the
public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
References
[1] A. Nautsch, A. Jime´nez, A. Treiber, J. Kolberg, C. Jasserand, E. Kindt,
H. Delgado, M. Todisco, M. A. Hmani, A. Mtibaa, et al., Preserving privacy
in speaker and speech characterisation, Computer Speech & Language 58
(2019) 441–480.
[2] C. Mydlarz, J. Salamon, J. P. Bello, The implementation of low-cost urban
acoustic monitoring devices, Applied Acoustics 117 (2017) 207–218.
[3] J. Salamon, J. P. Bello, Deep convolutional neural networks and data aug-
mentation for environmental sound classification, IEEE Signal Processing
Letters 24 (3) (2017) 279–283.
[4] N. Tomashenko, B. M. L. Srivastava, X. Wang, E. Vincent,
A. Nautsch, J. Yamagishi, N. Evans, J.-F. Bonastre, P.-G. Noe´,
33
M. Todisco, J. Patino, The VoicePrivacy 2020 challenge evaluation
plan, https://www.voiceprivacychallenge.org/docs/VoicePrivacy_
2020_Eval_Plan_v1_1.pdf (2020).
[5] R. Cramer, I. Damg˚ard, J. B. Nielsen, Secure Multiparty Computation and
Secret Sharing, Cambridge University Press, 2015.
[6] A. Dalskov, D. Escudero, M. Keller, Secure evaluation of quantized neural
networks, arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.12435 (2019).
[7] Z. Yang, Z. Dai, Y. Yang, J. Carbonell, R. R. Salakhutdinov, Q. V. Le,
Xlnet: Generalized autoregressive pretraining for language understanding,
in: Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS), 2019,
pp. 5754–5764.
[8] T. Peng, The staggering cost of training SOTA AI models, SyncedReview,
https://medium.com/syncedreview/the-staggering-cost-of-training-sota-
ai-models-e329e80fa82 (2019).
[9] N. Carlini, C. Liu, U´. Erlingsson, J. Kos, D. Song, The secret sharer:
Evaluating and testing unintended memorization in neural networks, in:
28th USENIX Security Symposium, 2019, pp. 267–284.
[10] N. Subramani, D. Rao, Learning efficient representations for fake speech
detection, in: 34th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020, pp.
5859–5866.
[11] P. Smaragdis, M. Shashanka, A framework for secure speech recognition,
IEEE Transactions on Audio, Speech, and Language Processing 15 (4)
(2007) 1404–1413.
[12] M. A. Pathak, B. Raj, S. D. Rane, P. Smaragdis, Privacy-preserving speech
processing: cryptographic and string-matching frameworks show promise,
IEEE Signal Processing Magazine 30 (2) (2013) 62–74.
34
[13] M. A. Pathak, B. Raj, Privacy-preserving speaker verification and iden-
tification using Gaussian mixture models, IEEE Transactions on Audio,
Speech, and Language Processing 21 (2) (2013) 397–406.
[14] J. Porteˆlo, B. Raj, A. Abad, I. Trancoso, Privacy-preserving speaker veri-
fication using garbled GMMs, in: 22nd European Signal Processing Con-
ference (EUSIPCO), IEEE, 2014, pp. 2070–2074.
[15] M. Keller, MP-SPDZ: A versatile framework for multi-party computation,
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2020/521, https://eprint.iacr.org/
2020/521 (2020).
[16] S. R. Livingstone, F. A. Russo, The Ryerson audio-visual database of emo-
tional speech and song (RAVDESS): A dynamic, multimodal set of facial
and vocal expressions in North American English, PloS one 13 (5).
[17] G. Trigeorgis, F. Ringeval, R. Brueckner, E. Marchi, M. A. Nicolaou,
B. Schuller, S. Zafeiriou, Adieu features? End-to-end speech emotion recog-
nition using a deep convolutional recurrent network, in: IEEE International
Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), 2016,
pp. 5200–5204.
[18] B. Milde, C. Biemann, Using representation learning and out-of-domain
data for a paralinguistic speech task, in: 16th Annual Conference of the
International Speech Communication Association (INTERSPEECH), 2015,
pp. 904–908.
[19] J. Liu, M. Juuti, Y. Lu, N. Asokan, Oblivious neural network predictions
via MiniONN transformations, in: ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, 2017, pp. 619–631.
[20] P. Mohassel, Y. Zhang, SecureML: A system for scalable privacy-preserving
machine learning, in: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2017,
pp. 19–38.
35
[21] B. D. Rouhani, M. S. Riazi, F. Koushanfar, DeepSecure: Scalable provably-
secure deep learning, in: 55th Annual Design Automation Conference
(DAC), 2018.
[22] M. S. Riazi, C. Weinert, O. Tkachenko, E. M. Songhori, T. Schneider,
F. Koushanfar, Chameleon: A hybrid secure computation framework for
machine learning applications, in: Asia Conference on Computer and Com-
munications Security, ACM, 2018, pp. 707–721.
[23] C. Juvekar, V. Vaikuntanathan, A. Chandrakasan, GAZELLE: A low la-
tency framework for secure neural network inference, in: 27th USENIX
Security Symposium, 2018, pp. 1651–1669.
[24] N. Agrawal, A. Shahin Shamsabadi, M. J. Kusner, A. Gasco´n, QUOTIENT:
two-party secure neural network training and prediction, in: ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2019, pp. 1231–
1247.
[25] M. S. Riazi, M. Samragh, H. Chen, K. Laine, K. Lauter, F. Koushanfar,
XONN: XNOR-based oblivious deep neural network inference, in: 28th
USENIX Security Symposium, 2019, pp. 1501–1518.
[26] P. Mishra, R. Lehmkuhl, A. Srinivasan, W. Zheng, R. A. Popa, Delphi:
A cryptographic inference service for neural networks, in: 29th USENIX
Security Symposium, 2020.
[27] N. Kumar, M. Rathee, N. Chandran, D. Gupta, A. Rastogi, R. Sharma,
CrypTFlow: Secure TensorFlow inference, in: 41st IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, 2020.
[28] S. Wagh, D. Gupta, N. Chandran, SecureNN: 3-party secure computation
for neural network training, Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technolo-
gies 2019 (3) (2019) 26–49.
[29] M. Dias, A. Abad, I. Trancoso, Exploring hashing and cryptonet based ap-
proaches for privacy-preserving speech emotion recognition, in: IEEE Inter-
36
national Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP),
2018, pp. 2057–2061.
[30] F. Teixeira, A. Abad, I. Trancoso, Privacy-preserving paralinguistic tasks,
in: IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Pro-
cessing (ICASSP), 2019, pp. 6575–6579.
[31] R. Gilad-Bachrach, N. Dowlin, K. Laine, K. Lauter, M. Naehrig, J. Werns-
ing, Cryptonets: Applying neural networks to encrypted data with high
throughput and accuracy, in: International Conference on Machine Learn-
ing, 2016, pp. 201–210.
[32] S. Davis, P. Mermelstein, Comparison of parametric representations for
monosyllabic word recognition in continuously spoken sentences, IEEE
Transactions on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal processing 28 (4) (1980)
357–366.
[33] D. Beaver, Efficient multiparty protocols using circuit randomization, in:
J. Feigenbaum (Ed.), Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’91, Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, 1992, pp. 420–432.
[34] M. De Cock, R. Dowsley, C. Horst, R. Katti, A. Nascimento, W.-S. Poon,
S. Truex, Efficient and private scoring of decision trees, support vector
machines and logistic regression models based on pre-computation, IEEE
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing 16 (2) (2019) 217–230.
[35] R. Dowsley, Cryptography based on correlated data: Foundations and prac-
tice, Ph.D. thesis, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany (2016).
[36] R. Cramer, I. Damg˚ard, D. Escudero, P. Scholl, C. Xing, SPDZ2k : Efficient
MPC mod 2k for dishonest majority, in: Annual International Cryptology
Conference, 2018, pp. 769–798.
[37] M. Keller, E. Orsini, P. Scholl, MASCOT: faster malicious arithmetic se-
cure computation with oblivious transfer, in: ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, 2016, pp. 830–842.
37
[38] I. Damg˚ard, V. Pastro, N. Smart, S. Zakarias, Multiparty computation from
somewhat homomorphic encryption, in: Annual Cryptology Conference,
2012, pp. 643–662.
[39] B. David, R. Dowsley, R. Katti, A. C. Nascimento, Efficient uncondition-
ally secure comparison and privacy preserving machine learning classifica-
tion protocols, in: International Conference on Provable Security, Springer,
2015, pp. 354–367.
[40] M. De Cock, R. Dowsley, A. C. A. Nascimento, S. C. Newman, Fast, pri-
vacy preserving linear regression over distributed datasets based on pre-
distributed data, in: 8th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and
Security (AISec), 2015, pp. 3–14.
[41] K. Fritchman, K. Saminathan, R. Dowsley, T. Hughes, M. De Cock,
A. Nascimento, A. Teredesai, Privacy-preserving scoring of tree ensembles:
A novel framework for AI in healthcare, in: IEEE International Conference
on Big Data, 2018, pp. 2412–2421.
[42] A. Agarwal, R. Dowsley, N. D. McKinney, D. Wu, C.-T. Lin, M. D. Cock,
A. C. A. Nascimento, Protecting privacy of users in brain-computer inter-
face applications, IEEE Transactions on Neural Systems and Rehabilitation
Engineering 27 (8) (2019) 1546–1555.
[43] D. Reich, A. Todoki, R. Dowsley, M. De Cock, A. Nascimento, Privacy-
preserving classification of personal text messages with secure multi-party
computation, in: Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems
(NeurIPS), 2019, pp. 3752–3764.
[44] C. Guo, A. Hannun, B. Knott, L. van der Maaten, M. Tygert, R. Zhu,
Secure multiparty computations in floating-point arithmetic, arXiv preprint
arXiv:2001.03192.
[45] M. De Cock, R. Dowsley, A. C. A. Nascimento, D. Railsback, J. Shen,
38
A. Todoki, High performance logistic regression for privacy-preserving
genome analysis, https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.05377 (2020).
[46] T. Araki, J. Furukawa, Y. Lindell, A. Nof, K. Ohara, High-throughput
semi-honest secure three-party computation with an honest majority, in:
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
2016, pp. 805–817.
[47] Y. Lindell, A. Nof, A framework for constructing fast MPC over arith-
metic circuits with malicious adversaries and an honest-majority, in: ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2017, pp.
259–276.
[48] H. Eerikson, M. Keller, C. Orlandi, P. Pullonen, J. Puura, M. Simkin, Use
your brain! Arithmetic 3PC for any modulus with active security, in: 1st
Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2020), Schloss
Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum fu¨r Informatik, 2020.
[49] Y. Yang, L. Deng, S. Wu, T. Yan, Y. Xie, G. Li, Training high-performance
and large-scale deep neural networks with full 8-bit integers, Neural Net-
works 125 (2020) 70–82.
[50] B. Jacob, S. Kligys, B. Chen, M. Zhu, M. Tang, A. Howard, H. Adam,
D. Kalenichenko, Quantization and training of neural networks for effi-
cient integer-arithmetic-only inference, in: 2018 IEEE/CVF Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2018, pp. 2704–2713.
[51] O. Catrina, S. De Hoogh, Improved primitives for secure multiparty integer
computation, in: International Conference on Security and Cryptography
for Networks, 2010, pp. 182–199.
[52] O. Catrina, A. Saxena, Secure computation with fixed-point numbers, in:
International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security,
2010, pp. 35–50.
39
[53] B. McFee, C. Raffel, D. Liang, D. P. Ellis, M. McVicar, E. Battenberg,
O. Nieto, librosa: Audio and music signal analysis in Python, in: Proceed-
ings of the 14th Python in Science Conference, Vol. 8, 2015, pp. 18–25.
40
